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RESUMEN: El artículo intenta aclarar la naturaleza de las características específicas de la adaptación 
del sistema político democrático a las condiciones tradicionalistas en el contexto de la investigación 
científica política comparada. Sobre la base de la experiencia histórica y política del imperio ruso, la 
Unión Soviética, la Federación de Rusia señaló que en Rusia y en algunos países de la CEI se ha 
formado una autoritaria-modernización de regímenes políticos presidenciales que la implementación 
de una misión poderosa y un estado fuerte puede contribuir a la aceleración de la ejecución de los 
programas de desarrollo. La definición propuesta de régimen político intrapolítico refleja el 
funcionamiento de configuraciones de poder más específicamente históricas dentro de los regímenes 
clásicos, generalmente de naturaleza autoritaria y presidencial en forma política y jurídica. 
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ABSTRACT: The article attempts to clarify the nature of the specific characteristics of the adaptation 
of the democratic political system to traditionalist conditions in the context of comparative political 
scientific research. Based on the historical and political experience of the Russian empire, the Soviet 
Union, the Russian Federation noted that in Russia and in some CIS countries an authoritarian-
modernization of presidential political regimes has formed that the implementation of a powerful 
mission and a strong state can contribute to the acceleration of the execution of development 
programs. The proposed definition of intrapolitical political regime reflects the functioning of more 
specifically historical configurations of power within classical regimes, generally of an authoritarian 
and presidential nature in political and legal form. 
KEY WORDS: political regime, intra-political regime, authoritarianism, leadership, political 
history. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The present stage of political development requires studying the key parameters, factors, and 
characteristics of political and socio-economic transformations in the CIS countries, as well as their 
comparative analysis from the perspective of neo-institutionalism.  
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To correct some established political assessments and expert judgments, it is imperative not only to 
traditionally expand the range of empirical sources analyzed but also to implement a research project 
for a comparative analysis of the political transformations of post-Soviet states. The latter allows 
revealing general and special patterns in the process of post-communist transformations.  
Especially relevant is the study of the phenomenon of "political authoritarianism", which explains the 
power self-organization and self-defense method of dictatorships established in backward and 
middle-developed countries". The question of the political will of authoritarian individuals and 
institutions, as well as the degree of their objective or subjective conditionality, is debatable. 
Postmodern political science concepts are based on the recognition of authoritarianism as an 
antagonistic order in relation to democracy. Reducing authoritarianism to a narrow interpretation of 
the dictatorial political regime limits the knowledge of contradictory political reality.  
The socio-political system of modern capitalism periodically enters a state of crisis and this requires 
timely adaptation of market and power configurations (Petras I&Veitmeyer.2003).  Wil and Ariel 
Durant subtly observed that "in order to adapt to new conditions and in order to survive, the imitative 
majority follows the original minority, which in turn follows the creative pioneer hero which includes 
all these Pasteurs, Morse, fords, Wright brothers, Marx, Lenins, Mao-Zedong..." (Durant W.& Durant 
A.). The concept of ‘political regime’ is actively used to classify forms of government and their 
interactions with socio-political systems.   
DEVELOPMENT.  
Materials and methods. 
Max Weber, Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Raymond Aron, Talcott Parsons, Robert 
Michels, Hannah Arendt, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Maurice Duverger, Carl Joachim Friedrich, L. 
Shapiro, R. Gestil  noted that political regimes operate within the framework of socio-political 
systems, which are characterized by objectified methods of sovereignty, the principles of functioning 
of governmental branches, the participation of the opposition in political life, etc. Regimes 
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classification uses such criteria as authoritarianism and pluralism, centralism and bureaucracy, 
etatism and anarchism, egalitarianism and elitism, totalitarianism and democracy, etc. (Tsygankov A. 
P. 1995). 
In contrast to the political system, the political regime is more tied to the subjective factors of the 
historical process, to the personalities of political leaders and sovereigns, and the current socio-
political situation. Domestic political scientists V.N. Abramov, M.G. Anokhin, V.A. Akchasov, A.P. 
Butenko, A.L. Gromyko, C.Yu. Kashkin, S.A. Kireeva, A.I. Kovler, A.M. Migranyan, E.N. 
Moshchelkov, A.V. Oblonsky, A.M. Salmin, N.A. Sakharov, E.G. Soloviev, E.P. Teplov, A.P. 
Tsygankov, R.A. Khomeleva, V.P. Chervony, L.M. Entin A.S. Panarin, V.P. Pugachev, A.I. 
Soloviev, O.F. Shabrov considered the determining stages in the formation of the concept of ‘political 
regime’, analyzed and systematized existing modern scientific approaches to its understanding 
established in modern political science, and presented a specific definition of this category. The 
literature shows that the political regime as a political and legal category is characterized by the 
relationship between the concepts of political and state regimes (Kurskova G. Y. M. 2010), the form 
of government, civil society, and the political system (Shipunov G. V. 2011).   
The scientific literature suggests determining the regime by the degree of political freedom of citizens, 
as the framework of its necessary implementation, and as the degree of effectiveness of state power 
(Paigina D. I. 2015). There is also a disagreement on such issues as the influence of the institutional 
structure of authoritarian regimes; the role of formal and informal political practices in the context of 
the logic of the development of autocracies; parameters of the choice of political leaders, actors of 
incumbents and the opposition; the consequences of the spread and development of authoritarian 
regimes, and the reasons for the freezing of democratic transit in post-communist countries 
(Makarenko B. I. Melvil A. Yu 2014).  
Researchers generally agree that the political regime intrinsically includes both administerial methods 
and means of exercising power, as well as ideological characteristics, but it is hardly probable to 
change public consciousness with the help of administerial technologies since it requires strategic 
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work with ideas, values, and attitudes, as well as their analysis ‘through their unity, differences, and 
interactions’ (Kudryavtsev Yu. A. 2012). The rotations of the parliamentary, the parliamentary-
presidential, and the presidential-parliamentary regimes were observed in many countries (Emirov R. 
M. 2016). However, the problems of transition from authoritarianism to democracy are not the only 
concern for the post-Soviet states, as much as the issues of institutionalization and consolidation of 
the political regime (Borisov N. 2011). 
The research of this phenomenon was carried out on specific historical materials based on previously 
conducted studies and publications by the authors (Kislitsyn S. A., Petrovas.V. Terenteva M. S. 
2019). The authors apply comparative methods in political science, historical, and systemic contexts, 
which allowed determining general trends in the evolution of political regimes and their variations. 
Neo-institutionalism also served as the methodological basis, suggesting that institutions represent 
‘rules of the game’ that rational individuals create to facilitate interactions with each other. The 
literature highlights a model of an authoritarian dogmatic personality based on a cognitive closure 
organized around the belief that strong power is necessary; such personality forms a rigid structure 
of intolerance towards others.   
Theoretical background. 
The first political regime in the framework of the early feudal monarchy can be considered the rule 
of the early Rurik dynasty, which was featured by the autonomy of local princes, the preservation of 
military-democratic traditions of veche popular assembly, heathen beliefs, and military expansion. 
Russia reached its political peak under Yaroslav the Wise when the centralization of the ancient 
Russian state was at the possible highest level. Feudal-republican intra-political regimes developed 
in Novgorod and Pskov functioned based on the leading role of the boyar (seignoral) elite. The 
creation of this regime, or, as we say, the intra-political regime, is explained by the influence of the 
European democratic tradition and, particularly, the influence of the Hanseatic League (Isaev B. A. 
2013).    
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A parity princely-boyar intra-political regime was formed in the Principality of Galicia–Volhynia. In 
Vladimir-Suzdal principality, which was the center of the northeastern outskirts of the former Kievan 
Rus’, a grand-ducal intra-political regime was formed; the role of the veche and the boyars was 
demoted to secondary. Although the Vladimir-Suzdal principality entered a period of civil strife and 
disintegration and was subjected to a dreadful invasion of the Mongol empire, nevertheless, the 
tradition of the grand-ducal political regime was put into practice as soon as the conditions for this 
arose.  
The influence of the Mongolian statehood on the formation of political regimes in northeastern Russia 
cannot be overestimated, although this factor cannot be considered as the absolute beginning of the 
national state. The statecraft of the Golden Horde is described by historians as military-feudal. The 
political regime of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state was significantly different from Muscovy since a 
European version of vassalage developed here without servile submission to the autocrat. It can be 
considered as a more progressive intra-variant, which was not established in Russia due to the egoism 
of the Catholic nobility of Lithuania.     
The political regime of Ivan the Terrible was designed to eliminate the remnants of feudal 
fragmentation, create integrated government machinery and expand the territory of Muscovy. 
Initially, these goals were achieved within the framework of the temporary intra-political regime of 
the Select Council by decent methods. But the tsar was not satisfied with the pace of transformation, 
and he switched to methods of accelerated centralization along the paths of terror. This second 
temporary terrorist intra-political regime of 1562-1570 within the framework of the reign of Ivan the 
Terrible had received the name ‘oprichnina’. 
After the end of the Rurik dynasty, the establishment of an estate of the realm monarchy proceeded 
with the rise of the influence of the Assembly of the Land (zemsky sobor), which realized the right to 
elect monarchs. Almost the entire XVII century is characterized by the estate of the realm since the 
assemblies acquired the prerogatives of the legislator and the supreme executive power, including 
even the highest court. The reign of Aleksey Mikhailovich (Alexis of Russia) gradually acquired more 
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and more absolutist-autocratic features. Peter the Great put all the initiated reforms based on forcing 
and coercion and brought them to the creation of an absolutist Empire.  
After the death of Peter the Great, the mode of power was constantly changing; moreover, 
personalized intra-political regimes arose within its framework. They can be divided into two 
varieties: 1) the anti-national pro-German absolutist regime; 2) the rule of the noble political elite. In 
1762, as a result of the coup, the wife of Peter III of Russia Catherine II, most commonly known as 
Catherine the Great, came to power; her reign is estimated by historians as enlightened absolutism. 
The name of Alexander I became a genericized name for the political regime of the first quarter of 
the XIX century. Some particular reforms implemented by the emperor under the influence of the 
Private Committee suggest that the political regime of these years can be profiled as authoritarian 
liberalism, which represents the development of the enlightened absolutism. The coming to power of 
Nicholas I, notorious as the executioner of the Decembrists, meant the conservation of the 
traditionalist autocratic internal policies, both in form and content. Police despotism has become the 
main feature of the intra-political regime of the second quarter of the XIX century.  
The authoritarian and reformist political statecraft of Alexander II was ended by his successor, 
Alexander III. The conservative counter-reformist regime continued to function during the reign of 
Nicholas II. The first period of his reign was relatively calm - up until the first Russian revolution of 
1905-1907. Under the influence of revolutionary actions, Russia gradually became a no longer 
absolute monarchy, but partially limited in certain elements to the ‘Duma monarchy’ (referring to the 
influence of the State Assembly).   
The coup of 1917 February Revolution established a republican political system and a regime of dual 
power without its constitutional entrenchment. Both of intra-regimes by Alexander Guchkov and 
Alexander Kerensky were transient. This stage should have ended with the establishment of either 
the right-wing military (Lavr Kornilov) or the left communist dictatorship. The second option was 
implemented in the course of the October Revolution; the legitimization of the Bolsheviks took place 
due to the existence of the Soviet parallel power.  
8 
 
Deployment of the intraparty strife (which often took on quite a personal character) has begun after 
the departure of the Leninist-Bolshevik intra-political regime from the political arena; this led to the 
formation of an intra-political regime within the framework of the Soviet-Communist system - the 
Stalinist-Bolshevik political regime. Certain elements of state control over society were traced already 
under Vladimir Lenin; under Joseph Stalin, they assumed a universal character. The totalitarian 
Stalin-Bolshevik regime was covered by the 1936 Constitution, but in reality, it was a personified 
military-police intra-political regime that was carrying out massive political repressions.  
Nikita Khrushchev came to power soon after Stalin’s death. His anti-Stalinist activity was of a 
reformist nature. At the same time, his risky and utopian programs forced the party-state 
nomenclature elite to remove him from power within the framework of existing legal norms. Leonid 
Brezhnev and his entourage pursued a political course towards stability and conservatism. All around, 
despite Khrushchev and Brezhnev’s diversity as leaders of the state and the party, the existence of a 
common nomenclature-communist regime of power is manifestly obvious; the latter consists of two 
intra-political regimes, related by the personalities of their leaders.  
Perestroika (reformation) in the political sphere led to the revival of the multiparty system and the 
pushing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to second positions in state 
administration. It also led to the establishment of the Presidency and, in turn, caused the formation of 
a specific Soviet intra-political regime of Mikhail Gorbachev, which included elements of the Soviet 
system and sources of the new anti-Soviet system. Having gained power in August 1991, Boris 
Yeltsin carried out several measures that went beyond the framework of the then Constitution of the 
USSR; first of all, he signed the Belovezha Accords on the dissolution of the USSR and liquidated 
the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Soviet power itself in October 1993.  
The political system functioning at the present stage is enshrined in the 1993 Constitution of Russia. 
It appears as a presidential republic with a formal statement of the equality and independence of the 
three branches of government, but actually concentrating all the levers of government in the hands of 
the president, who is out of control throughout his entire term magistrates. Within the framework of 
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the new democratic system and the authoritarian-liberal political regime at the turn of the XX and 
XXI centuries, a new Putin's intra-political regime was formed. The Russian model of the distribution 
of power has acquired rigidly authoritarian features inherent in developing countries (Попов С.В. 
2011). But this regime of power operates based on the Constitution adopted during the presidency of 
Boris Yeltsin.  
The Yeltsin’s model was described in the literature as oligarchic-democratic, and the regime of 
Vladimir Putin, who counted on real political independence, supra-party system and statehood, as 
liberal authoritarianism. Some political scientists have begun to use the term ‘managed democracy’ 
to define this political regime (Baranov N. A. 2007). Other authors use the concept of a hybrid regime, 
which is characterized by personification and undivided power, as well as by legitimization of power 
in a democratic way (Khakimov R. S. Khomenko V. V., Abdurakhmanov R. F., Khusnutdinova A. 
T. 2013).  
The essence of traditional Russian autocracy was manifested primarily in the personality of monarchs, 
leaders and modern presidents. The autocratic form of governance is highly dependent on random 
personality traits and therefore more easily disintegrates. The rampage of oprichnina and ‘playing 
fool for God's sake’ by Ivan the Terrible, the ‘lifeless’ conservatism of Nicholas I, jesuitism and truly 
satanical will of Joseph Stalin designated the highest points of development of Russian despotic 
statehood and at the same time predetermined three great catastrophes of Russian statecraft (Lubsky 
A.V.1998).  
Arch Getty believes that archaic political practices are peculiar to modern Russia more than other 
modern state systems. Patrimonialism, clientelism, as well as quite some other traditional practices, 
is the most common among developed industrial societies in Russia; they are also most tenacious and 
have played the leading role for the longest time (Arch Getty.2016). Thus, the development of a 
historical monarchical mentality is clearly manifested in political regimes that have repeatedly 
changed in the history of Russia.   
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In the political history of the former republics of the USSR, there are many common points related to 
the presence in the past of the Imperial core led by Russian autocrats, then the Soviet Communist 
center of the totalitarian state. Therefore, we will not pay special attention to them. But in the post-
Soviet history, one can distinguish in the former Soviet republics, along with the current democratic 
regime of power, internal intra- political regimes. Here are some examples. Since 1992, a 
‘presidential-parliamentary’ republic functioned in Ukraine - coupled with a president who practically 
did not rule. Then, it was turned to the parliamentary-presidential, which again changed later in the 
opposite direction. The change of emphasis in the relationship between the institution of presidency 
and parliamentarism in Ukraine became the inherent cause of constant conflicts of political actors 
and, of course, exacerbated the intra-elite struggle (Kislitsyn S. A., Petrova S. V. 2017).  
Different fluctuations were observed between helpless pluralism and the policy of dominant power 
with a gradual slide towards consolidated authoritarianism in later Leonid Kuchma years, the 
restoration of dysfunctional democracy under Viktor Yushchenko, and the expressive manifestation 
of authoritarian tendencies under Viktor Yanukovych (Baranov N.A 2011). Kyiv initiated a military 
operation against the people of Donbas under the cover of ‘anti-terrorist action’.  
The intra-political regime headed by businessman Petro Poroshenko officially positioned itself as a 
democratic, market-based, European-oriented, etc. However, the alleged ban on the communist 
movement of Ukraine as a phenomenon, the elimination of anti-regime political opposition, the ban 
on several media, including Russian TV channels, the monopoly of official ideology, terrorist 
methods of pressure, the ban on anti-system opposition, universal control of the media, the 
militarization of all spheres of society, aggression against disobedient regions, the militarized rise to 
power (or through the pressure of ideology-driven masses) - all these are classic signs of a totalitarian 
regime.  
In Ukraine, the model of a Bandera-fascist regime began to take shape, including militant Ukrainian 
chauvinism (based on anti-Russian prejudice), anti-communism, and latent anti-Semitism (Degtyar 
And .2017), but in the classical sense, it is quite incorrect to consider the Ukrainian regime as Nazi-
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type since not only elements of the Nazi political format, but also facts of civic activism of a national-
democratic nature were observed, which is proved by President Volodymyr Zelensky rise to power 
in 2019.   
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Belarus (for some time) was a parliamentary republic led 
by Stanislav Shushkevich. Under the 1994 Constitution, Belarus became a unitary democratic 
presidential republic with the liberal intra-regime of Stanislav Shushkevich and the long-playing 
intra-regime of ‘managed democracy’ by Alexander Lukashenko existing within its framework. 
According to most experts, with the departure of Lukashenko from the world of politics, this intra-
regime, and maybe the political system in general, will significantly change.  
Dynamics of the democratic process in Transcaucasia is distinctly differed by the pace of adaptability 
of political regimes to demands of the modern reality; intra-options are observed in this area no less 
prominently than in other CIS countries. In Georgia, the intra-political regime of Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
was replaced by ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Eduard Shevardnadze; 
Shevardnadze resigned in the November 2003 to bloodless ‘Rose Revolution’ led by Mikheil 
Saakashvili and his political allies. However, on 2 October 2012, Saakashvili admitted his party's 
defeat in Georgia's parliamentary election against the Georgian Dream coalition led by the tycoon 
Bidzina Ivanishvili. The 2013 presidential race was won by big business protégé Giorgi 
Margvelashvili, and the 2018 election - by former French diplomat Salome Zourabichvili. Thus, 
billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili became the real sole leader in the country and formed the new latent-
authoritarian regime of power.   
A new intra-regime emerged in the region, which condemned Saakashvili’s authoritarianism but 
retained all of his political guidelines for foreign and domestic policy. Such regimes also operate in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, separated from Georgia.  
The political statecraft of Armenia generally can be called ‘hybrid’ or intermediate, since it combines 
the features of both authoritarianism and democracy. In democratic Armenia, the intra-regime of 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan was replaced in 1998 by the intra-regime of Robert Kocharyan, and in 2008 - 
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by Serzh Sargsyan. Despite the transition to a parliamentary form of government, an attempt was 
made to maintain the semi-authoritarian Sargsyan’s intra-regime However, as a result of public 
unrest, a new regime of Nikol Pashinyan came to power (Safarian A. 2018). 
Also, in Azerbaijan, a hybrid political regime was established with the removal of the representative 
of the Communist Party Ayaz Mutallibov from power. Such a regime combined the democratic norms 
of the constitution with the authoritarianism of senior management, and with elements of hereditary 
power of the eastern type. The intra-political regime of former Azerbaijani Popular Front leader 
Abulfaz Elchibey was replaced by the intra-regime of Major-General of KGB Heydar Aliyev. Modern 
Azerbaijan appears to be consisting of the personal power of President Ilham Aliyev, the powerful 
party of the state, and weak opposition; the current situation is also featured by the close interaction 
of bodies of government with business organizations.  
The political regimes of Central Asian countries are characterized by a tough presidential-
authoritarian regime with conservative paternalistic nationalism, except for Kyrgyzstan, where 
unstable democracy is being formed (Baranov N. A. 2011). Due to stability and the absence of shifts 
of leaders, the regimes and even intra-regimes in these regions rarely change. The regime of 
authoritarian power of President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been functioning in Kazakhstan for 
almost 30 years. And even after the election of the new president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2019, 
Nazarbayev maintains the position of the ‘leader of the nation’.  
In Tajikistan, the authoritarian regime of President Emomali Rahmon was established after the civil 
war; his rule is commonly regarded as a dictatorship. In Uzbekistan, the regime of the personal power 
of President Islam Karimov has been maintained for a long time; it was later replaced by the intra-
political regime of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Until 2006, a super-presidential intra-regime (in fact, 
dictatorship and personality cult) of the ‘president for life’ of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov 
(Türkmenbaşy, meaning Head of the Turkmen) had functioned in Turkmenistan. It was replaced by 
a more advanced new authoritarian intra-regime by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow (Omarov К. 
2018).    
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A national-democratic regime was formed in Moldova, within the framework of which were 
operating the nationalist intra-regimes of Mircea Snegur and Petru Lucinschi, the national-communist 
intra-regime of V. Voronin, the parliamentary-presidential regime of M. Ghimpu, M. Lupu, N. 
Timofti, and I. Dodon. (Fokina L. 2017) A pro-Russian people's democratic intra-regime also 
operates in the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.  
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia should be also mentioned in this context since these countries had 
developed an almost common nationalist pseudo-democratic regime with elements, on the one hand, 
of consolidated democracy, and, on the other, a course towards the glorification of local fascists. 
National democratic regimes have manifested some signs of ‘defective democracy’, along with 
several other distinctive features of the Baltic regimes (Seredenko S. 2018). At the same time, it 
should be noted that there are virtually no personal intra-political regimes in these countries since 
their heads of state are somewhat deprived of sovereign independence and pursue a policy under the 
strict control of the European Union and NATO.  
The intra-regime can be virtually presidential, with or without signs of authoritarianism, a simple 
authoritarian regime, and also a national-leadership regime. This tendency was manifested in Russia, 
during the existence of intra-regimes of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. A similar picture is 
observed in Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev’s intra-regime), in Belarus (Lukashenko), and in Armenia 
(Sargsyan), as well as in Georgia during the term of Saakashvili, and in Lithuania during Dalia 
Grybauskaitė presidentship. However, an authoritarian-leadership type of regime has not developed 
in the parliamentary republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova, in Ukraine, as well as in Moldova, 
Latvia and Estonia because of the lack of formation of national leadership, as the nations of these 
states are divided into several parts, in contrast to relatively unified (in terms of national-civil 
relations) Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. 
The political statecraft of Russia is a permanently changing factor within the framework of a 
particular political system of society, a set of certain determinations that are adequate to the 
organization of political power in the country, and also within a set of cultural and historical factors. 
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The foundation of the political regime in modern Russia and other CIS countries is represented by a 
comprehensive presidential power, which, according to the constitutions of these states, is the 
guarantor of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. In the 1990s its real effectiveness was 
somewhat insignificant since the activity of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin was 
manifested largely in the personnel policy in the highest echelons of power and led to the dominance 
of the executive branch of government. Yeltsin has begun as a hope of the nation but ended his 
political activity as a low-ranking authoritarian leader.  
A significant increase in the effectiveness of state power during Putin’s presidency was also followed 
by governmental ability to solve the main problems of the modern development of Russian society, 
but only in an authoritarian way. Amendments to the 2020 Constitution grant more institutional 
prerogatives to the Parliament and the Court but retain the presidential character of the regime and 
allow Vladimir Putin to take the highest office in the country for the fifth time. 
Results and discussion. 
Currently, Russia is undergoing the process of institutional stabilization of the presidential regime, 
which has an authoritarian and personalized character, obviously associated with the personality of 
Vladimir Putin.  
The relative stability of the existing political regime is carried out by relying on the state security, 
defense, and law enforcement agencies, as well as by the monopolization of federal electronic media 
and ITs to form and mobilize public consciousness. The historical mental matrix of public opinion is 
actively used, which is associated with the memory of the victorious great Patriotic war, Patriotic 
traditions, the worldview of the Russian Orthodox Church, the desire to serve the Russian Cossacks, 
and others.  
The Historical consciousness of Russians is evaluated as an important resource of national security 
policy, the formation of civil identity of young people. Attempts are made to update certain social 
slogans in order to appeal to the Soviet labor enthusiasm. (Just remember the award of the title "Hero 
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of labor" to the oligarch Rotenberg). The proposed expansion of the powers of the Parliament, the 
constitutional court and the state Council, even while maintaining the leading role of the post of 
President, rationalizes the political system and removes the question of the exploitation of the 
monarchical mentality and the mandatory personalization of power in Russia. It is considered that in 
the future, as the Constitution improves, it will be possible to switch the personal type of ensuring the 
legitimacy of the presidential political regime into a more rational and bureaucratic structural type. 
The characteristic features of the presidential regimes of Belarus and Kazakhstan are in many ways 
similar to the Russian ones, which led to their mutual attraction and the formation of an integrative 
interstate association. The political leaders of these republics Lukashenko and Nazarbayev are the 
direct descendants of the party-Soviet nomenclature elite; they are using the norms of the modern 
electoral system and the possibilities of the presidential regimes they have formed for opportunistic 
purposes. Positioning themselves as national leaders and gaining mass support of voters through their 
activities, they formed authoritarian-leadership regimes with an abundance of elements of the cult of 
their personalities. At the same time, these regimes have a modernizing orientation, are focused on 
allied relations with Russia, participate in discussions and criticism of the tendency to rewrite the 
history of the great Patriotic war and the Second world war in General, and generally preserve 
elements of the Soviet identity. 
Currently, there is no single universally accepted ideology for the development of the integration of 
political regimes of authoritarian-leader modernization type in the post-Soviet space. Russia and 
partially Belarus and Kazakhstan, as the most powerful integrational geopolitical centers, are putting 
forward an updated ideology of the Eurasian unified post-Soviet space. The authoritarian regimes of 
the Central Asian countries support this trend to one degree or another.  
Paternalism, etatism, and faith in the country's top leader, who are struggling with the political elite, 
which perverts his political course, are still quite common on the territory of Russian Eurasian 
civilization. The personality of the ruler is very important due to the populational mental specifics, 
which largely determines the real invariant of the prevailing political regime that has developed over 
16 
 
a certain period within the framework of the existing socio-political system. Such an invariant of the 
regime can be defined as ‘intra-political regime’.  
CONCLUSIONS. 
In the process of developing a democratic system in the post-Soviet countries and the emergence of 
its institutional distortions, authoritarian regimes are usually formed based on the firm establishment 
in power of the political leaders who possess a set of features of an authoritarian personality.  
An authoritarian leader can become a national political leader of a charismatic type. This type of 
politician embodies not only personalistic qualities but also demonstrates the totality of authoritarian 
methods of political leadership. Due to the sociocultural characteristics of the post-Soviet space, the 
credibility and experience of an effective ruler are of great importance, which largely determines the 
real invariant of the prevailing political regime that has developed over a certain period within the 
framework of the existing socio-political system. This internal mode invariant can be defined as 
‘intra-political regime’. This concept allows for deeper operationalization of research within the 
framework of traditional concepts of authoritarianism and totalitarianism.  
It seems possible to conclude that all countries in the post-Soviet space without exception (behind 
some peculiarities of Russia) have developed national-democratic regimes with different variations; 
internal intra-political regimes, usually of an authoritarian nature, were formed and replaced within 
this framework.  
The authors are not in agreement with the assertion that the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine 
and other countries took place because the ruling leaders were not able to answer new challenges 
since everything happened in a different way. Moreover, this can be traced to countries where leaders 
did not allow deviant development. Among them are soft-authoritarian, hard-authoritarian, liberal-
authoritarian, authoritarian-democratic, and even authoritarian-neo-fascist outlines of power, formed 
under pressure from the leaders of these countries.  
17 
 
Russia has an authoritarian-modernization type of presidential political regime of a relatively 
democratic nature with a significant role of leaders’ personalities. The factor of personality 
contributed to the accelerated or delayed implementation of development programs within the 
framework of an objective agenda of tasks pretty much in all countries.  
Authoritarianism and the presidency in the post-Soviet space are to some extent objective and 
immanently interdependent. As the evidence from practice shows, the presidents in the post-Soviet 
space countries, within the framework of their authoritarian intra-regimes, implemented their 
solutions to problems and led countries to various changes and a certain development.  
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